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Abstract
We present some arguments why existing methods for rep-
resenting agents fall short in applications crucial to artifi-
cial life. Using a thought experiment involving a fictitious
dynamical systems model of the biosphere we argue that
the metabolism, motility, and the concept of counterfactual
variation should be compatible with any agent representa-
tion in dynamical systems. We then propose an information-
theoretic notion of integrated spatiotemporal patterns which
we believe can serve as the basic building block of an agent
definition. We argue that these patterns are capable of solv-
ing the problems mentioned before. We also test this in some
preliminary experiments.
Introduction
Within artificial life the concept of an agent is fundamen-
tal. While studying life-as-it-could-be (Langton, 1989), we
also study agents-as-they-could-be. An intuitive approach
to agents is possibly to say that while not reproducing, i.e.
during their individual lifetime, living organisms are agents.
The concept of an agent in this way generalizes the con-
cept of living organisms by de-emphasizing reproduction
and with it Darwinian evolution. This point of view is also
in line with the common practice of referring to robots or
software programs as agents.
To give some more background (see Barandiaran et al.,
2009, for a more detailed discussion), there are a few prop-
erties that seem universally acknowledged as necessary for
something to be referred to as an agent. The first of those is
probably the capacity to act (Schlosser, 2015). However,
Barandiaran et al. (2009) notice that this already presup-
poses a form of individuality i.e. an “entity” that this ca-
pacity can be attributed to. Consequently they put the indi-
viduality criterion first. Having perception is another fairly
uncontroversial requirement (see e.g. Russell and Norvig,
1995, who for practical reasons ignore individuality and
only require “anything” with perception and action). The
last concept which is often alluded to is that of some form
of goal-directedness of the agent. The goals agents should
strive to achieve are usually required to be in the agents’
own interest/intrinsic (e.g. preservation) and not the goals of
some other agent (or programmer). For a thorough treatment
on the latter point see Froese and Ziemke (2009).
We broadly agree on the three (or four) main require-
ments of individuality, perception and action, as well as
goal-directedness. However we are not satisfied with the
lack of formal definitions of the notions themselves. We
therefore take a different and particularly formal approach
to the problem of defining agents.
From the start we limit ourselves to a mathematically
well-defined class of systems i.e. dynamical systems and
their generalization to stochastic processes (we will refer to
dynamical systems only, inclusion of stochastic processes is
implied). We want to define agents as entities that can exist
within a dynamical system. In other words, we are look-
ing for a representation of agents within dynamical systems.
While there is no guarantee that such a representation even
exists, we believe that even if we fail, there might be some
insights into why we fail. This would also help the commu-
nity to understand the concept of agents better. At the same
time we expect that dynamical systems are actually a pow-
erful enough class of systems to consider and that they will
turn out to be able to contain convincing examples of agents.
This optimism stems from the fact that dynamical systems
have been extremely successful in modeling systems from
physics through chemistry to biology. Compelling recent
examples of dynamical systems which directly suggest they
can contain agents can be found in Virgo (2011); Bartlett and
Bullock (2015). If we are successful, then we would obtain
a definition of agents as features of dynamical systems and
eventually even of life as a feature of such systems. This
would be a step towards defining life as a natural kind as re-
quired by Cleland and Chyba (2002). Finally our hope is to
reveal the formal counterparts of the intuitions about living
systems formulated by Maturana and Varela (1980).
In order to make it more clear what we mean by agents
within a dynamical system, consider the following exam-
ple, to which we will come back throughout this paper. Say
we had a dynamical system that is a sufficiently exact ap-
proximation of the entire biosphere including the influence
of incoming (from the sun) and outgoing radiation. During
individual runs of this dynamical system, given the right ini-
tial conditions, things should occur that correspond to living
organisms in the real biosphere. In this case we would say
that within this dynamical system agents occur. Our goal is
to find a mathematical representation of these agents. Since
agents are a generalization of living organisms, we expect
that agent representations can at least in principle exhibit
the full range of phenomena exhibited by living organisms.
Limitations should only be due to the chosen dynamical sys-
tem and not inherent to the agent representation.
This paper is a contribution to the discussion of the foun-
dations of artificial life. It does not present a solution of
how to represent agents in dynamical systems. Rather it
defines a notion that can identify intrinsically distinguished
spatiotemporal patterns that we believe can act as the basic
building block on which a theory of agents can be built. The
strategy we have in mind here is the following. First, define
the spatiotemporal patterns which are suitable to represent
both living (bacteria, animals, plants) and non-living (rocks,
crystals) persistent objects. Then further classify those pat-
terns into classes exhibiting features of agents such as per-
ception, action and goal-directedness. Spatiotemporal pat-
terns that satisfy all criteria will represent agents.
Also note that for the formal definition we here restrict
ourselves to finite discrete-time distributed1 dynamical sys-
tems with an already given “space-like” and “time-like”
structure. Examples of this include cellular automata. The
restriction to finiteness is due to the improved clarity this
choice brings with it. The notions we present are well-
defined in various more general settings. However, currently
the spatiotemporal-like structure seems necessary to us.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next
section will present three challenges to representations of
agents in distributed dynamical systems. Then we look at the
literature and discuss ways to represent agents formally and
in how far they succeed or fail to meet our expectations. We
will then quickly introduce the setting of distributed dynam-
ical systems and formally introduce a notion that we believe
is able to identify the spatiotemporal patterns. We give the
intuition behind this notion and discuss it in the light of the
three requirements mentioned before. Finally, we present
some preliminary results in the setting of the game of life.
The problem of tracking agents
As mentioned before we expect the agent representation to
be able to deal with all features associated to living organ-
isms in the biosphere. Two such features, their metabolism
and their motility present a major challenge to the represen-
tation of agents. These two features both make it hard from
a formal standpoint to “keep track” of the living organism
within a trajectory of the system. A third feature, we call it
1Distributed means that the state of the system is given as a set
of values of multiple variables or degrees of freedom.
counterfactual variation, that we attribute to the biosphere
makes it hard to represent agents reliably across different
initial conditions. This list of three features makes no claim
to be complete, obtaining a complete list is ongoing research
however. The three features in more detail:
Metabolism All known living organisms are metabolic
(Szathma´ry et al., 2005) and the metabolism is also in the
discussion for its possible role in the origins of life (see e.g.
Dyson, 1985; Kauffman, 2002). This highlights its funda-
mental role and any final agent representation must accom-
modate for this. The difficulty is the following.
Assume that the sufficiently accurate biosphere model
from the introduction is particle-based, i.e. it describes the
time evolution of the degrees of freedom of all the particles
in the biosphere. Say at a time t1 we are given all the parti-
cles (and their degrees of freedom) that pertain to some bac-
terium. Then a naive way to represent this bacterium would
be to just track the time evolution of each of those particles.
This we could (in principle) easily do in our model as well.
However the particles that the bacterium is made up of at a
later time t2 are not the same as those at time t1 because of
the bacterium’s metabolism. We would end up with particles
floating around in the environment of the bacterium and not
the bacterium itself. At the same time there would be parti-
cles that now pertain to the bacterium that we would not be
tracking.
An agent representation therefore would need to be able
to track the bacterium itself and not just a specific set of
degrees of freedom. One way this could be solved is by con-
stantly readjusting or refocusing on the degrees of freedom
pertaining to the agent.
Note that we cannot be entirely sure that there is no coor-
dinate transformation which would let us track living organ-
isms (i.e. their corresponding structures in a model) by just
following a particular set of degrees of freedom. However
we are not aware of such a transformation. Any criterion
however that can be used to refocus on an agent should be
related to any coordinate transformation which results in the
“agents’ own” coordinate system.
Motility Living organisms can be motile and like the
metabolism motility is in the discussion for its role in the ori-
gins of life (Froese et al., 2014). A representation of agents
must therefore be capable of dealing with motile agents.
Motility plays a similar role for field theory models of the
biosphere as the metabolism plays for particle based mod-
els. The degrees of freedom of a field theory are the field
amplitudes at each point in space so that tracking those de-
grees of freedom over time only means to track the field in
a specific region of space. However motility demands that
agents are not bound to a fixed region in space. Then we
again need to adjust (track) the degrees of freedom that con-
stitute the agent as time passes.
Counterfactual variation A third feature concerns an-
other kind of variation of the degrees of freedom that can
represent agents in a dynamical system. Namely variation
under different initial conditions. We attribute to the bio-
sphere a large variety of possible counterfactual histories
that also support living organisms. Think of a biosphere
where the continents are shifted a bit for example. This
would not seem to necessarily destroy the possibility of the
biosphere (geosphere) to contain living organism.
Furthermore, we attribute to agents and living organisms
the capability to behave differently under different environ-
mental situations. The agent should be able to “take a deci-
sion” i.e. to walk either right or left, or eat the apple or the
pear. Depending on these “decisions” the agent will again
pertain to different degrees of freedom.
The counterfactual histories can be studied in the dynam-
ical system setting by studying multiple trajectories through
state space. Each trajectory corresponds to a different his-
tory (and possibly future). If the “same” agent occurs in two
different trajectories it can behave differently in one from the
other. This can be associated with different decisions (e.g.
Ikegami and Taiji, 1998).
The existence of benign counterfactual histories in our
biosphere is an assumption and not possible to prove. How-
ever it is in line with the successful way physics models sys-
tems (cf. the models of Virgo, 2011; Bartlett and Bullock,
2015) and therefore in line with our general approach. Now
given a set of counterfactual histories containing living or-
ganisms we expect that the degrees of freedom which in one
history pertain to a living system at time t need not pertain
to a living system within another such history at t (or in fact
ever). More specifically, the degrees of freedom pertaining
to a bacterium in one history need not pertain to any living
organism in another.
If the biosphere can contain living organisms within var-
ious counterfactual histories, then the dynamical systems
model of the biosphere must be able to contain agents un-
der various initial conditions. In that case the agent repre-
sentation must be able to represent all the agents in all the
trajectories where they occur. If for two different initial con-
ditions the degrees of freedom pertaining to agents at time t
are different as well, then the agent representation must be
able to exhibit this difference.
Related work
We should stress that we are only interested in work that
relies on the intrinsic properties of the dynamical systems
itself to represent agents. References to concepts like ac-
tion, perception, and goal-directedness, if they are not de-
fined in terms of the dynamical system are not acceptable
in this case. The publication that most directly tackles the
problem of agent representation that we are aware of is the
insightful paper of Krakauer et al. (2014). They solve the
problems of metabolism and motility by evaluating informa-
tional measures of closure and autonomy of sets of random
variables. Given a system represented by a set of random
variables at each point in time (i.e. represented by a dynam-
ical Bayesian network as also defined below) they propose
an algorithm that decides whether to include a random vari-
able at a specific time step into the set representing the agent
or leave it in the set representing the environment. This de-
cision is made according to whether the inclusion into the
agent contributes to the closure or autonomy of the agent.
What this approach lacks however is the capability to deal
with counterfactual variation. Since they use measures like
mutual information and mutual conditional information that
average over all states of the random variables in order to
decide whether they belong to the agent or not, the partition
of the random variables at each time step is fixed for all pos-
sible trajectories of the system. In order to deal with coun-
terfactual variation it must be possible to have one partition
into agent and environment for one trajectory and another
partition for another trajectory. The same argument remains
true for any approach that results in a fixed partition of the
nodes in a dynamical Bayesian network. This includes the
work of Balduzzi (2011) which results in a coarse-grained
version of the network. The effective information that the
glider contains about past states of the game of life, which
was revealed in this work, should however be related the in-
trinsic spatiotemporal patterns that we investigate here.
Another very relevant and inspiring work is the work on
the cognitive domain of the glider and autopoiesis in the
game of life by Beer (2014b,a). This approach is capable
of dealing with metabolism, motility, as well as counterfac-
tual variation as it analyses spatiotemporal patterns and their
internal mechanisms. The spatiotemporal patterns may have
finite extension and can therefore occur or not occur within
multiple trajectories at multiple times. The internal mech-
anisms are analyzed with respect to their production of the
next spatial pattern inside the spatiotemporal pattern. The
only caveat seems to be that the analysis is quite time con-
suming and does not have formal expressions of all the in-
volved notions. We use the notion of spatiotemporal patterns
as presented by Beer and hope that the measure we propose
contributes to the formalization of the notions in his work.
An approach that seems to solve the problem of
metabolism and counterfactual variation is the Markov
blanket-based clustering used by Friston (2013). As the in-
teracting degrees of freedom vary over time in a particle
based system, it is possible to define a time dependent ad-
jacency (or interaction) matrix. From this matrix Friston
derives a Markov blanket matrix which can be used to clas-
sify the degrees of freedom into hidden, sensory, active, and
internal states. This nicely defines an agent like structure
within the degrees of freedom and through the time depen-
dence of the adjacency and therefore also the Markov blan-
ket matrix allows for the degrees of freedom to vary within a
single trajectory and across initial conditions. In the case of
a field theoretical model where the adjacency of the degrees
of freedom does not vary it is not directly obvious to us how
to translate this. This means that motility could be a problem
for the approach in such a model. However, it is definitely an
alternative to our more information theory-based approach.
Methodologically, the framework of Lizier et al. (2014)
for distributed computation is very closely related to ours.
They investigate localized versions of mutual information
and conditional mutual information to track and highlight
information transfer, storage, and modification in dynami-
cal Bayesian networks. This reveals spatiotemporal patterns
very similar to ours. The main formal difference is in fact
that instead of localizing the (conditional) mutual informa-
tion we localize multi-information in the same way. In this
way our work is just a trivial extension of this work. The fo-
cus of our work however is different as we are not so much
interested in phenomena that are related to computation and
more interested in revealing spatiotemporal entities or ob-
jects which might form the basis of an agent definition. Re-
lated work on spatiotemporal filtering (Shalizi et al., 2006;
Flecker et al., 2011) of cellular automata differs from ours
in a similar way. While “interesting” phenomena in the time
evolution of single trajectories are revealed, the focus is not
on connecting the interesting phenomena together in order
to obtain entities.
Conceptually our work is also closely related to the in-
tegrated information theory due to Tononi et al. Origi-
nally (Tononi et al., 1994) this involved measurements of
multi-information whose localized (in the sense of Lizier
et al.) version we also employ as an estimate of integra-
tion. Newer versions (Oizumi et al., 2014; Albantakis and
Tononi, 2015) involve a more elaborate construction which,
importantly, is also localized in a certain way. The lat-
ter detect distinguished integrated spatial patterns which are
constructed to resolve “what a system ‘is’ from its own in-
trinsic perspective” (Albantakis and Tononi, 2015). How
these spatial structures are connected in time however is not
treated. Our approach also aims at revealing intrinsic struc-
ture but crucially looks for spatiotemporal patterns i.e. pat-
terns with a temporal as well as a spatial extension or com-
positional structure. In Tononi (2004); Balduzzi and Tononi
(2008) temporal integration is mentioned with respect to op-
timal spatial and temporal scale or “grain size” detection.
Our goal is different since we don’t want to find a coarse-
graining here. We want to reveal the complete lifetimes of
agents as a single spatiotemporal pattern.
Dynamical Bayesian networks
Finite discrete-time distributed dynamical systems and their
stochastic counterparts can be represented by dynamical
Bayesian networks. Dynamical here just means that there
is an interpretation of time in those networks. Distributed
means that, at each time step, there are multiple given ran-
dom variables whose states together define the state of the
entire network at that time step.
More formally, a (dynamical) Bayesian network is a di-
rected acyclic graph G = (V,E) with nodes V and edges
E. Each node i has an associated random variable Xi with
state space X taking values xi ∈ X (for simplicity we as-
sume that all nodes have identical state spaces but this is
not necessary for the definitions to hold). Furthermore each
node is equipped with a mechanism pi(xi|xpa(i)) which
gives the conditional probability distribution of Xi given
the parents pa(i) of node i in G. Note that for any set
A ⊆ V we write XA := ({Xi|i ∈ A}) for the random
variable composed of the random variables in A. We as-
sume that our network has a set V0 of nodes without par-
ents. As Ay and Polani (2008) note we can then define a
partition of V into (V0, V1, V2, ...) (called time slices) where
Vt+1 := {i ∈ V | ∃j ∈ Vt,pa(i) = j}. In general
pa(Vt+1) ⊆ Vt since some nodes might not have any chil-
dren. Here we assume pa(Vt+1) = Vt. This allows us to
interpret the various nodes in each Vt as those nodes repre-
senting the state of the distributed system at time t. We can
also interpret the cardinality of the set Vt as the spatial ex-
tension of the state. In this paper this cardinality does not
change over time just as e.g. in cellular automata.
The defining property of Bayesian networks (including
dynamic ones) is that the joint probability distribution2 pV
can be factorized in a way compatible with the structure of
the graph G i.e.:
pV (xV ) =
∏
i∈V
pi(xi|xpa(i)). (1)
To relate the dynamical Bayesian network to dynamical
systems note that the role of the dynamical law is played by
the product of all mechanisms in Vt:
pVt+1(xVt+1) =
∑
xVt
∏
i∈Vt+1
pi(xi|xpa(i))pVt(xVt). (2)
Recall that
⋃
i∈Vt+1 pa(i) = Vt by definition. We can also
write the above in terms of the Markov matrix:
p(xVt+1 |xVt) =
∏
i∈Vt+1
pi(xi|xpa(i)). (3)
In order to equip the dynamical Bayesian network with a
join probability distribution pV we then only have to de-
fine an initial probability distribution pV0 and propagate it
throughout the network according to Eq. 2.
Trajectories and spatiotemporal patterns
Here we formally define the notion of trajectories and spa-
tiotemporal patterns. The class of the spatiotemporal pat-
terns is very large and includes patterns that are of no spe-
cific interest. How we distinguish between those and more
important patterns will be defined in the next sections.
2For a set of nodes A we write pA for the probability distribu-
tion pA : XA → [0, 1].
A spatiotemporal pattern xO of a dynamical Bayesian
network on graph G = (V,E) is a set of nodes O ⊆ V
together a set of particular values {xi ∈ X |i ∈ O}.
A trajectory xV of a dynamical Bayesian network on
graphG = (V,E) is a spatiotemporal pattern with p(xV ) >
0. In our setting this also means that there is an initial con-
dition xV0 such that xV is possible under the time evolution
induced by the Markov matrix or dynamical law.
We say that the spatiotemporal pattern xO occurs in a tra-
jectory xV of the network iff xO ⊆ xV .
Employing the time slices Vt of the network we can also
look at the time slices xOt := xO ∩xVt of any spatiotempo-
ral pattern xO.
Integrated spatiotemporal patterns
This section defines the notion of an integrated spatiotem-
poral pattern. Such patterns obey a condition which distin-
guishes them within the class of all spatiotemporal patterns.
First we fix some further terminology.
We define the the evidence for integration of an object O
with respect to a partition pi of O as the local mutual infor-
mation
mipi(xO) :=
{
0 if pO(xO) = 0,
log pO(xO)∏
bj∈pi pbj (xbj )
else. (4)
Then, we say a spatiotemporal pattern xO is integrated iff
for all possible partitions pi of the set O of random variables
the evidence for integration of O with respect to pi is posi-
tive. Considering all possible partitions is also done by Al-
bantakis and Tononi (2015).
The interpretation of this is the following. The joint prob-
ability pO(xO) is the probability that all the xi with i ∈ O
occur together within single trajectories. I.e. among all tra-
jectories there are those in which O occurs and their prob-
ability contributes to this joint probability. The probability∏
bj∈pi pbj (xbj ) however is the product of the probabilities
that each part xbj occurs by itself in any trajectory including
as part of xO. If a part of xO often occurs by itself without
the rest of xO occurring then this reduces the evidence for
integration of O. This makes sense if we want to interpret
the integrated spatiotemporal patterns as persistent objects
like rocks, crystals, but also living organisms. If we con-
sider for example a rock, the probability that a rock occurs at
some point in time without a rock occurring at the previous
and next time step in close vicinity is quite low, whereas the
probability that where there was a rock before there will be
a rock shortly after is quite high. In fact anytime that a spa-
tial pattern (a time slice of a spatiotemporal pattern) causes
(in an intuitive sense) another spatial pattern at the next time
step their joint probability will rise and especially if the first
spatial pattern is among the only causes of the second, their
evidence for integration will be high.
What about the spatial integration however? The exis-
tence of rock in one place probably does increase the prob-
ability for more rock to be around it, but not extremely. It is
perfectly possible and occurs frequently, that the rock ends,
also that it is just a small piece of rock. So the evidence for
spatial integration might not be so strong.
Now if we turn to living organisms, the evidence for tem-
poral integration should also be high since they are autopoi-
etic. Their spatial integration will probably be higher than
that of rocks (and crystals) as half a bacterium is much less
likely than a whole whereas half a rock is still a rock and
those are not so uncommon. This reasoning scales up to
larger living organisms.
We note that the evidence can also be interpreted in more
information-theoretic terms. For example as the superflu-
ous length of a codeword for the sequence xO when we
base the encoding on the product probability distribution∏
bj∈pi pbj (xbj ) instead of on the joint probability. This will
be discussed in more detail in future work. We also intend to
investigate in how far the integrated spatiotemporal patterns
are independent of (possibly moving) frames of reference.
Since they are not only integrated across time slices but in-
stead across any partition we are optimistic in this regard.
Integrated spatiotemporal patterns and the
tracking problem
The spatiotemporal patterns can solve the tracking problem.
To see this take the perspective of time slices and say that at
some time t a living organism is a configuration of degrees
of freedom which increases the probability of a particular
configuration of other degrees of freedom at a subsequent
time t+ that is again a living organism. More specifically, a
living organism will lack certain molecules before absorbing
them, conversely there will be a surplus of other molecules
before they are ejected from the living organism. Therefore
the probability for molecular exchange will be higher than
for maintaining the same composition. This means the spa-
tiotemporal patterns traversing the degrees of freedom as-
sociated to the molecules will have a higher evidence for
integration over time. Similarly, in the field-theoretic setting
the field configuration represented by the spatial pattern will
increase the probability of the neighboring degrees of free-
dom to assume a certain configuration. This leads to more
evidence for the integration of the moving pattern.
With respect to the problem of counterfactual variation we
can see the following. Integration is calculated directly for
spatiotemporal patterns within a trajectory and the local mu-
tual information vanishes for all spatiotemporal patterns that
do not occur in this trajectory (see Eq. 4). Then, if the spa-
tiotemporal patterns that occur in different trajectories are
different, the integrated spatiotemporal patterns will also be
different. Thus, if integrated spatiotemporal patterns repre-
sent agents, these can occur on some degrees of freedom in
one trajectory and not occur on those in another. This means
counterfactual variation won’t be a problem.
Experimental indications
We present here the results of three preliminary experiments.
The first is conceived to hint at the kind of trajectories
that show high evidence of integration. The second experi-
ment suggests that traversal of degrees of freedom or motil-
ity/metabolism can at least in principle be detected by inte-
gration. Similarly the third experiment shows that in princi-
ple counterfactual variation is no obstacle for integration.
All experiments use a 4 × 4 grid with game-of-life dy-
namics and toroidal boundary conditions as the distributed
dynamical system. As the initial distribution pV0 we use the
uniform distribution in order to explore the whole range of
possible trajectories. We investigate only patterns covering
three time steps t = 8, 9, 10 and thereby neglect a lot of
transient patterns that are difficult to interpret. In principle,
however, our method does apply to transient patterns as well.
Instead of integration we calculated only the evidence for
integration with respect to the finest possible partition (EV-
IFPP). The finest possible partition of a setA of nodes is just
the partition where each block is a set containing exactly one
node in A. A positive EVIFPP is a necessary condition for
integration and therefore a crude indication for it.
For the first experiment we looked at all trajectories that
differ at time steps t = 8, 9, 10 (a lot of trajectories end up
with all cells white at those times). For each of those tra-
jectories we calculated the EVIFPP for the spatiotemporal
pattern xO = (xV8 , xV9 , xV10). So the time slices of xO are
global states in this case. Since the xO are global states this
is more an evaluation of the integration of the trajectories
that result from the different initial conditions. In Fig. 1 five
such different global three-time-step patterns with high val-
ues of integration are shown including the completely blank
spatiotemporal pattern and the spatiotemporal patterns (ig-
noring symmetric versions) with the highest EVIFPP. We
can see that the blank spatiotemporal pattern has positive
but much lower EVIFPP than some other patterns. For the
second experiment we chose a specific trajectory shown in
the first row in Fig. 2 which exhibits a moving pattern and
searched through all patterns covering time steps t = 8, 9, 10
and fixing n = 14 cells (i.e. nodes of the dynamic Bayesian
network) in each time slice xOt . We can see that the de-
grees of freedom (i.e. the cells or nodes) making up both the
spatiotemporal pattern with minimal EVIFPP (second row
in Fig. 2) as well as that with maximal EVIFPP (third row
in Fig. 2) vary over the three time steps and adapt to the
configuration of the global state. Note that the patterns with
minimal and maximal EVIFPP are not unique.
For the third experiment changed the initial condition of
the trajectory by shifting all values of the initial condition
of the second experiment “down” one cell. This results in a
different trajectory shown in the first row of Fig. 3. We then
evaluated the spatiotemporal pattern that results from fixing
Figure 1: Three three-time step spatiotemporal patterns.
Each row shows the three global spatial patterns that make
up the spatiotemporal pattern xO. The first row shows the
blank spatiotemporal pattern and the others show the two
patterns with the highest EVIFPP. The EVIFPP values are
(from top to bottom) 4.9, 81.9, and 85.4 respectively.
the same nodes as in the spatiotemporal pattern with maxi-
mal EVIFPP found in the second experiment on the changed
trajectory (see row two in Fig. 3). We also evaluated the EV-
IFPP of the spatiotemporal pattern that results from shifting
the fixed nodes of maximal EVIFPP pattern in the same way
as the initial condition (see row three in Fig. 3). The pattern
with the same fixed nodes as the pattern that formerly had
maximal EVIFPP now has lower EVIFPP than the pattern
with the nodes adapted to the new initial condition.
Discussion
The first experiment shows that the completely blank trajec-
tory has low spatiotemporal EVIFPP and that more “inter-
esting” trajectories have higher EVIFPP (Fig. 1). This can
also be done with other methods e.g. counting black cells.
However, our method is general and doesn’t use any prior
knowledge e.g. which color of cells to count. For us this
result is a necessary condition for further investigation.
The second experiment shows that the degrees of free-
dom pertaining to spatiotemporal patterns with high EV-
IFPP adapt over time to the changing configurations of the
system. This shows that EVIFPP is capable of solving the
metabolism and motility problems. We expect that the same
holds true for evidence of integration with respect to any
partition and therefore also for integration itself.
The third experiment shows that under a variation of the
initial condition the degrees of freedom pertaining to spa-
Figure 2: A three-time step part of a trajectory (can also
be seen as a global spatiotemporal pattern) in the first row
and two local spatiotemporal patterns on this trajectory in
the second and third row. Both spatiotemporal patterns in
rows two and three have n = 14 specified cells per time
slice. The second (third) row shows a pattern attaining the
minimal (maximal) EVIFPP of 32.5 (54.4) among all pat-
terns with n = 14 on the trajectory of row one. The global
spatiotemporal pattern of row one has EVIFPP of 55.0.
tiotemporal patterns with high EVIFPP change accordingly.
Since the different trajectories generated from changed ini-
tial conditions correspond to counterfactual histories this
shows that the EVIFPP solves the problem of counterfactual
variation. Again we expect this to carry over to integration.
We note that larger grids become hard to evaluate compu-
tationally very fast. For square grids the size of the Markov
matrix grows with 2a
2
where a is the number of rows and
columns of the grid. We also note that due to the very lim-
ited grid size we are studying any pair of cells is just sep-
arated by maximally one neighborhood cell. This leads to
strong dependencies which might make it irrelevant to place
unspecified cells around patterns like the blinker (as for ex-
ample suggested by Beer (2014a)). We had hoped to reveal
such well known patterns and their extensions. Turning to
larger grids is a next step in our research.
Conclusion
We have presented our current approach to representing
agents in dynamical systems. Three criteria that we expect
from such an agent representation were motivated with a
thought experiment involving a dynamical systems model
of the biosphere. The literature was reviewed in the light
of these criteria. We also introduced our current candidate
measure for identifying intrinsic spatiotemporal patterns in
dynamical Bayesian networks. These patterns form the ba-
sic building blocks of our approach to representing agents.
We argued that this approach can deal with the three crite-
ria for agent representations that we have put forward. Ex-
perimentally we verified this for a crude approximation to
our more involved concept of integration. However experi-
mental results are currently inconclusive with respect to the
tracking of structures that are actually relevant for agents.
Therefore we see the value of this work mostly as a contri-
bution to the discussion of the foundations of artificial life.
Future work will bring more decisive results.
Figure 3: The three-time step part of the trajectory that re-
sults from shifting the values of the initial condition of the
trajectory in the first row of Fig. 2 “down” by one cell. The
second row shows the spatiotemporal pattern with the same
fixed nodes as the pattern that had maximal EVIFPP on the
trajectory of Fig. 2 but now on the shifted trajectory. The
EVIFPP of this is 39.8. The third row shows the spatiotem-
poral pattern with the fixed nodes shifted “down” in the same
way as the initial condition. This pattern has EVIFPP of 54.4
and is the maximal EVIFPP for patterns with n = 2. As ex-
pected this is the same value we found for the pattern with
the non-shifted nodes on the non-shifted trajectory.
Acknowledgements
We thank Christoph Salge, Olaf Witkowski, Nicola
Catenacci-Volpi, Julien Hubert, Nathaniel Virgo, and
Nicholas Guttenberg for discussions on this topic. Part of
this research was performed during Martin Biehl’s time as
an International Research Fellow of the Japan Society for
the Promotion of Science. The third author was supported in
part by the H2020-641321 socSMCs FET Proactive project.
References
Albantakis, L. and Tononi, G. (2015). The Intrinsic Cause-
Effect Power of Discrete Dynamical SystemsFrom El-
ementary Cellular Automata to Adapting Animats. En-
tropy, 17(8):5472–5502.
Ay, N. and Polani, D. (2008). Information flows in causal
networks. Advances in Complex Systems, 11(01):17–
41.
Balduzzi, D. (2011). Detecting emergent processes in cel-
lular automata with excess information. Advances in
Artificial Life, ECAL, abs/1105.0158.
Balduzzi, D. and Tononi, G. (2008). Integrated information
in discrete dynamical systems: Motivation and theoret-
ical framework. PLoS Comput Biol, 4(6):e1000091.
Barandiaran, X. E., Paolo, E. D., and Rohde, M. (2009).
Defining agency: Individuality, normativity, asymme-
try, and spatio-temporality in action. Adaptive Behav-
ior, 17(5):367–386.
Bartlett, S. and Bullock, S. (2015). Emergence of Compe-
tition between Different Dissipative Structures for the
Same Free Energy Source. In Proceedings of the Euro-
pean Conference on Artificial Life, pages 415–422. The
MIT Press.
Beer, R. D. (2014a). Characterizing autopoiesis in the game
of life. Artificial Life, 21(1):1–19.
Beer, R. D. (2014b). The cognitive domain of a glider in the
game of life. Artificial Life, 20(2):183–206.
Cleland, C. E. and Chyba, C. F. (2002). Defining Life. Ori-
gins of life and evolution of the biosphere, 32(4):387–
393.
Dyson, F. J. (1985). Origins of Life. Cambridge University
Press.
Flecker, B., Alford, W., Beggs, J. M., Williams, P. L., and
Beer, R. D. (2011). Partial information decomposition
as a spatiotemporal filter. Chaos: An Interdisciplinary
Journal of Nonlinear Science, 21(3):037104.
Friston, K. (2013). Life as we know it. Journal of The Royal
Society Interface, 10(86).
Froese, T., Virgo, N., and Ikegami, T. (2014). Motility at the
origin of life: Its characterization and a model. Artifi-
cial Life, 20(1):55–76.
Froese, T. and Ziemke, T. (2009). Enactive artificial intel-
ligence: Investigating the systemic organization of life
and mind. Artificial Intelligence, 173(3–4):466–500.
Ikegami, T. and Taiji, M. (1998). Uncertainty, possible
worlds and coupled dynamical recognizers.
Kauffman, S. A. (2002). Investigations. Oxford University
Press, Oxford; New York.
Krakauer, D., Bertschinger, N., Olbrich, E., Ay, N., and
Flack, J. C. (2014). The information theory of indi-
viduality. arXiv:1412.2447 [q-bio]. arXiv: 1412.2447.
Langton, C. (1989). Artificial life. In Langton, C., editor,
Artificial Life, pages 1–47. Addison-Wesley.
Lizier, J. T., Prokopenko, M., and Zomaya, A. Y. (2014).
A framework for the local information dynamics of
distributed computation in complex systems. In
Prokopenko, M., editor, Guided Self-Organization: In-
ception, number 9 in Emergence, Complexity and
Computation, pages 115–158. Springer Berlin Heidel-
berg.
Maturana, H. R. and Varela, F. J. (1980). Autopoiesis and
cognition: the realization of the living. Springer.
Oizumi, M., Albantakis, L., and Tononi, G. (2014). From the
Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of Consciousness:
Integrated Information Theory 3.0. PLoS Comput Biol,
10(5):e1003588.
Russell, S. J. and Norvig, P. (1995). Artificial Intelligence:
A Modern Approach. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs,
N.J, 1st edition edition.
Schlosser, M. (2015). Agency. In Zalta, E. N., editor, The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2015 edi-
tion.
Shalizi, C. R., Haslinger, R., Rouquier, J.-B., Klinkner,
K. L., and Moore, C. (2006). Automatic filters for the
detection of coherent structure in spatiotemporal sys-
tems. Physical Review E, 73(3):036104.
Szathma´ry, E., Santos, M., and Fernando, C. (2005). Evolu-
tionary Potential and Requirements for Minimal Proto-
cells. In Walde, P., editor, Prebiotic Chemistry, number
259 in Topics in Current Chemistry, pages 167–211.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg. DOI: 10.1007/tcc001.
Tononi, G. (2004). An information integration theory of
consciousness. BMC Neuroscience, 5:42.
Tononi, G., Sporns, O., and Edelman, G. M. (1994). A mea-
sure for brain complexity: relating functional segrega-
tion and integration in the nervous system. Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences, 91(11):5033–
5037.
Virgo, N. (2011). Thermodynamics and the Structure of Liv-
ing Systems. University of Sussex. Unpublished PhD
thesis.
